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INAUGURAL ADDRESS

OF THE

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REV. D. L. CARROLL, D. D.

PRESIDENT OF HAMPDEN SYDNEY COLLEGE,

DELIVERED ON

HIS INDUCTION INTO THAT OFFICE.


PUBLISHED BY REQUEST OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES.

RICHMOND:

PRINTED BY THOMAS W. WHITE.

1835.

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L. L. Brainerd

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PRINCE-EDWARD, OCT. 8th, 1835.

Reverend and Dear Sir,

Believing that on the eve of your entering upon the performance of your official duties, as President of Hampden Sydney College, the public will be gratified with an exposition of your views on the important subject of youthful training; and harmonizing, as they do, with yourself in those which were so happily expressed on the occasion of your inauguration, the Board of Trustees at their late meeting unanimously resolved, that you be respectfully solicited to furnish a copy of the address, which was then delivered, for publication.

With sentiments of personal esteem, and with our best wishes for your private happiness and public usefulness, we remain,

Rev. and dear sir, yours, &c.

S. C. ANDERSON,	} <i>Ex. Committee.</i>
W. S. MORTON,	
B. F. STANTON,	

REV. D. L. CARROLL, D. D.

Gentlemen: Your communication, announcing a unanimous resolution of the Board of Trustees, soliciting of me a copy of my inaugural address for publication, has been duly received. I am happy to acknowledge the honor which they have thus conferred on me, whilst I yield a somewhat reluctant compliance with their request. The address was prepared with great haste, amidst anxieties and efforts to regain my health, and amidst all the inquietudes of journeying and absence from my home. Of its want of all pretensions to the classical elegance which characterizes some similar productions, no one can be more deeply sensible than the writer. Its publication is assented to *only* on the ground that it contains a general outline of "his views on the important subject of youthful training." The public have a right to know these, and he has no disposition to withhold from them his sentiments on this topic though they be expressed in a style that will not bear the test of a refined, literary criticism.

I am, gentlemen, with very high respect and esteem for you,

Yours truly,

D. L. CARROLL.

S. C. ANDERSON, Esq.	} <i>Ex. Committee.</i>
W. S. MORTON, M. D.	
Rev. B. F. STANTON,	

Prince-Edward, October 12th, 1835.

ADDRESS.

The long established usage of literary institutions has imposed on me the duty of addressing you on this occasion. Conformity to this usage has resulted in a mass of traditionary, common-place remarks on the general subject of education. It has also tended to make the single performance to which it gives rise, under whatever disadvantages prepared, the measure alike of the author's intellectual powers and classical attainments. But I do not complain of the custom which calls me to the discharge of this duty. Nor may I account it a grievance that I am limited by the subject on which I am to address you, to a track already rendered smooth and dusty by the multitude of feet that have trodden it before me.

You have a right, on this occasion, to expect from me an exhibition of my views in reference to that liberal education, whose interests in this institution we have now become mutually pledged to promote. The theme indeed is trite—the path is beaten: but perhaps it is not yet so hard that a man of common weight in passing over it may not hope to leave the individuality of his own footprints behind him.

Few words in the English language have been used with a more vague and indeterminate meaning than the term *education*. This term, as applied to many systems of instruction that have hitherto been pursued, has had any other rather than its true, etymological sense. It means literally *to educe, to evolve, to exercise or discipline*; and, as applied to man, it *ought* to mean the development and discipline of the entire powers of his being. But many of the systems that have stood unchanged for ages have been productive of any other rather than of these results. Whatever may have been their excellences they were not adapted to evolve and discipline all the appropriate powers of man. Between such arbitrary systems and one philosophi-

cally adapted to the entire susceptibilities of human nature, the difference is as great as that which marks the harmonious operations of the law of gravitation on the heavenly bodies from the blind impulse which gives random direction to the fragments of the riven rock. Much of late has been said and written on this subject, and much yet remains to be said and written before the systems of education shall have been so moulded and adjusted, as to square with the properties of that nature on which they are destined to operate. This remark is not made in the spirit of fault-finding, nor with any consciousness or claim on the part of the speaker that he is at all in advance of others in his views on this topic.

But to every observer of the course of things, it must be evident that human nature, in its accelerated movements towards a brighter æra in its history, will imperiously demand plans of training better suited to the elevation and rapidity of its career. The uncontrollable restlessness—the mighty reachings of our nature after those facilities by which it may attain its higher terrestrial destinies, have already been felt in the various departments of art and science which have recently been characterized by such surprising improvements. The very elements of human society are now entering into new combinations, and the circumstances of our present being undergoing a change. It is vain to suppose, then, that systems of education will not have to sympathize with such a state of things, and that the plan pursued in Oxford or Cambridge four centuries since will suit Hampden Sydney in eighteen hundred and thirty-five. I am no advocate for useless innovation, for fanciful theory, or for experiments of doubtful utility in the important work of training mind. The great desideratum, and that at which every man at the head of a literary institution ought to aim, is such a plan of education as shall embrace *the evolution and discipline of the entire powers of human nature, and their adaptation to the exigencies of man's being.*

On each of these particulars it is my design at present to submit for your consideration a few remarks. This, I am aware, is assuming ground on the subject of education of startling breadth. But it must

be maintained that the plan of a liberal education in this age ought to be such as to aim, first, at *the evolution* of *all* the faculties or powers of our nature. This assumes that there *are* such powers to be evolved : for the old philosophical adage—“*ex nihil nil fit*”—is true in this, if not in its original application. There is no machinery of education that can *make* human brains. Hence it will happen that, under the best system, there will be some learned dunces who will dose on through life beneath a leaden diploma.

But the greatest amount of native talent as well as the least, is equally undeveloped in the early stages of our existence. Man, in this respect, differs widely from the lower orders of the animal creation. They, at first, are endowed with an instinct, and in many instances, with a muscular power sufficient to secure all the ends of their being. On the contrary man makes his appearance in circumstances of impotency and undeveloped faculties, which lay an unlimited tax on maternal solicitude and sympathy. Innumerable cares are bestowed and a multitude of contrivances employed to develop his physical powers. And when, after much effort, the first steps of infancy are taken, then by a wise constitution of the Creator succeed the endlessly varied gambols of childhood, and the athletic exercises and recreations of youth, to give to these developed powers strength and facility of action. And here let it be remarked, as an indispensable prerequisite to a full development of the intellectual faculties, that the system of education should be such as to secure and perpetuate that healthful and vigorous play of the bodily functions with which the youth enters on his course of study. This is a subject which till recently has received but little attention. Young men, on entering College, have been treated, or permitted to treat themselves, as though they had just escaped from the *exuvie* of a mortal body, and had come forth pure spiritual essences, severed from all connection with an organic structure, and absolved from all obedience to organic laws. But these laws, if violated, will soon visit the execution of their penalty upon the offenders. Such a proclamation of independence of our corporeal nature will be followed by a *war* ; not as successful as the one which

resulted from the declaration of American independence—but a war in which the abused and aggrieved bodily functions will marshal such a host of pains and aches as shall recapture the revolted mind, and cast it into the innermost prison of gloom and despondency, where the best efforts for the full development of its powers can never reach it. The bodily structure of a Hercules could not sustain the violent infraction of its organic laws practiced by that youth, who from the plough or the sickle—from the summer evening sports on the green slope of his paternal farm, or from the chase over the hills and the vallies of his native woodlands, comes, and for a period of three or four years, confines himself to the precincts of the College and the Campus.

“Haud ignarus mali miseris misereri disco.”

Take away a healthful and vigorous play of the corporeal functions and you annihilate the very foundation on which the mind is to stand during the process of the evolution of its capacities. But with this foundation secured and rendered increasingly strong, the next step in a plan of liberal education is, if possible, *fully to evolve all the intellectual powers*. This indeed is a difficult task. There is a “*vis inertiae*” attaching to mind as well as to matter—a specific gravity of its own, furnishing less or more of counteraction to all the upward attractions brought to bear upon it. And many of the onerous and ill adjusted systems of the past have tended, with the single exception of memory, to overwhelm and depress the powers of the human mind. But what is wanted, is not a system that will develope mere memory, even to a degree once known to the speaker, in which the individual could *commit* the longest and most difficult demonstration in Euclid, while understanding and reason were profoundly asleep, and his mind wholly destitute of a solitary conception of the mathematical truths contained in the problem. We want a system adapted in its very nature to wake up *the inherent capabilities of thought* in the human mind—to teach it the art of beginning *to think*, and of *self-introspection*. The mind ought to know that it was made to walk alone without leading

strings even in its infancy. The first thing then in education, as in the original creation, is to obtain some power that will move on "the face of the great deep" of human intellect, and not only ripple its surface but reach far down into its mighty abysses—some power that will bring out all the mental faculties in that order, proportion, and harmony which characterize the other works of the Creator. A system of education should be made, if possible, to embrace some means of intellectual development analogous in their controlling power to the influence exerted on the minds of Burke, and Pitt, and Fox, by those mighty political events that marked the period of British history in which they lived. Were it practicable, it would supply a great desideratum in a plan of teaching, to introduce into the retirement of College some stimulus to mind like that furnished by those stupendous realities of life that form certain crises in man's history and bring forward genius in its highest and most august forms—something that should act on the mind of the student, as did the circumstances of the reformation on Luther, by which he arose from the melancholy of the monk to the majesty and might of a mind whose every thought was felt as a thunderbolt on the pillars of the papal throne—or as did that memorable cause of the tobacco stipend, pleaded by the immortal orator of Virginia. The circumstances connected with that cause seemed almost to create, at the time, those amazing powers which immediately surmounted all the force of his previous wayward habits, and afterwards enabled him to bring the shoulder of a Hercules to the wheel of the American revolution, and to make his electrical influence to be felt in two hemispheres. But as yet no appliances have been found better adapted to evolve the mental powers than a well regulated course of study in the ancient languages, the department of mathematics, and of the various sciences. These are the ordinary implements of intellectual development, but much of their efficiency will depend on the hands that wield them. The hand of dull mediocrity will blunt and rob them of their temper, whilst, in the hand of genius, they will be sharper than a two-edged sword piercing to the dividing asunder of the mightiest ligament that binds down the giant energies of the young

mind. The common course of collegiate study may, under the application of a master spirit, become the instrument of arousing all the intellectual powers to sleep no more forever.

But in the evolution of the entire capacities of our nature, man's *social powers* should not be omitted nor undervalued. True, these powers are partially developed when the youth enters College. The sweet charities of his early home—the reciprocity of maternal and filial affection, of sisterly and brotherly kindness, have brought him to the seat of learning with the social elements of his being measurably shapen. But they have not attained that growth, nor symmetry, nor polish, which fit the educated man for his future commerce with the polite world. Their further development and culture are not, therefore, to be regarded as beneath the dignity of the instructor's attentions and efforts. I know not by what fatality this subject has been so signally neglected in some of our Colleges and Seminaries of learning. Youth are permitted to live together in the halls of science under a system that insures a retrogradation from the refinement of feeling and polish of manners which they brought with them when they entered. A system which seems to assume it as granted, that they are to have no further intercourse or connection with the more refined of their species, and which seems to be disciplining their social principle for the seclusion of the monastery. This is as unphilosophical, as it is unjust to a department of those faculties with which a benevolent Creator has endowed us. If the social powers of our nature were, as some would have us believe, mere fragments compared with our higher capacities, yet it is the province of a good education to "gather up these fragments that remain, that nothing be lost" to our proper humanity.

Every literary institution ought to aim at such a well regulated intercourse amongst its students as would inspire them with a dignified self-respect—as would cause them, even in retirement, to conduct themselves with that delicacy and deference to each other's feelings that become a high-minded and honorable company of gentlemen associated in the pursuit of learning. They ought also, under proper restrictions, to min-

gle occasionally in the best circles of society around them. Neither their morals, their manners, nor their studies would suffer from that evolution and play of the social powers to which such an intercourse would give rise. I know indeed that a certain degree of awkward reserve, and bluntness of manners and recklessness of dress have, in some minds, become almost inseparably associated with genius. But a moment's reflection may convince any one that it requires no very extraordinary endowments from the Creator, to enable a man, after a little practice, to become a *clown* in his manners and a *sloven* in his apparel. Let it not be supposed, however, that in thus contending for the development of the social powers and cultivable graces of our nature, we countenance the contemptible littleness of dandyism. The mere dandy we despise as a thing whose definition the great American lexicographer has given in the following appropriate terms—"a male of the human species who dresses himself like a doll, and carries his character on his back." Between the peculiarities of such a creature and the dignified refinement and suavity of the educated gentleman, it were odious to institute a comparison. It is the latter to which regard is to be had in a course of education. All that we contend for is, that the youthful mind should be inspired with a deep consciousness of the existence and the worth of those social powers and kindly sympathies within itself, which bind it indissolubly to its species, and should be led to regard their development and culture as a *necessary* part of its preparation for future life.

But when education has awakened and called forth the intellectual and social capacities, it has done but a portion of its work in the evolution of the entire powers of our nature. Man has *moral* as well as mental and social capacities. He has a conscience as well as a memory. He is indued with all the appropriate powers of a moral being under a moral law, and responsible to his Maker. And we maintain that that system of education which overlooks these inherent powers of the immortal mind, is alike unphilosophical, unsafe, and utterly unworthy the enlightened spirit of the nineteenth century. The proper development of these powers must be considered a neces-

sary though an arduous department of effort in the education of youth. Like the other faculties, in early life, they exist only in their infolded susceptibilities of action. And did this create the only difficulty in their full development, it were trifling indeed. But these powers constitute that portion of our nature more directly involved in the effects of that great moral catastrophe under which the race is suffering. Yet they are moral powers still—strong, though in their infancy—mighty, even in their ruins. They lie like the giants of classic fable under *Ætna*, they have to struggle to throw off the superincumbent mass with which the apostacy has overwhelmed them. Are such powers to be left out of the account in a course of education, or consigned for their development and discipline to the school of chance? But how shall these powers be evolved? What stimuli shall we apply to them of sufficient energy to arouse and call them forth from their embarrassed retirements? To effect this the great truths of revelation alone are competent. These truths, under the application of their divine author, will do it. They are philosophically adapted to produce such a result. Between the great truths of God and the development of the moral powers of man, there is as striking an adaptation as that between light as the medium, and the structure of the eye as the organ of vision. The Bible, then, is the instrument by which we hope to effect a full and harmonious evolution of the moral powers of the young mind. And it savors as much of bad philosophy as it does of bad morals, to legislate the Bible out of the list of text books in our literary institutions. We appeal to it, not as a matter of theory or of opinion, but as a historical fact, whether the influence of the Bible when uncounteracted, has not always been salutary and mighty in arousing the moral capabilities of the young mind.

An instrument of such celestial temper we can never consent to dispense with in the training of youth, till we find a race that has no moral susceptibilities on which it can be brought to operate. But will not such an attempt to call forth the moral energies of their minds result in making our young men sectarian bigots? No: but the *ne-*

glect to do so may. Sectarian bigotry is the result of *neglected* moral powers. The simple and sublime truths of the Bible, brought skilfully in contact with the young mind, never made a sectarian bigot, and it is demonstrably certain they never can. But will not such a waking up of their moral powers terminate in making our young men *Christians*? It is admitted that such a result may follow. The acquaintance of the young mind with the pure oracles of God has a legitimate tendency this way. But what, if on the evolution of the moral faculties, such a consequence were to ensue? What loss would Earth or Heaven be called to sustain? Suppose our youth were to go from the seats of learning to their homes, to the social circles, and to the walks of professional life, with their moral constitution under the controlling influence of divine truth—with their minds elevated, and their hearts expanded, and glowing with the benevolence of heaven—would they be worse scholars, worse members of the family and of society, worse practitioners in the learned professions, worse *republicans*, than if they carried with them the cold creed of infidelity, and licentious practice of atheism? If a plan of education which embraces the means of thoroughly evolving the moral powers of youth, be on that account in danger of making them christians, let *this* danger be weighed in the balance with *that* of neglecting those powers, and of breaking in upon that harmony which God designed to subsist between all the capacities of human nature in every stage of their development and action.

But the work of education is not done when it has effected the evolution of all the appropriate powers of our nature. These powers, when aroused, are not to be left to themselves, to become frantic with their newly discovered strength, and, like the fabled race that sprang from the serpent's teeth, to clash with and consume each other. An *appropriate discipline* is to be applied. All these powers are to be brought into obedience to those laws designed and adapted to regulate their action. In the application of discipline to the intellectual powers, the great object to be aimed at is, *to bring each faculty to act with certainty, vigor, and regularity in its own sphere, whilst all maintain*

a well balanced action relatively to each other. This, in mental training, is the "consummation devoutly to be wished for"—a consummation too seldom realized in the education of youth. It is not uncommon in the history of educated mind, to notice what uncertainty attends the action of some one or more of its powers—what imbecility attaches to the operations of another, and what lawless irregularity to the working of a third. This induces a want of confidence in the mind itself, similar to that felt by the beginner in the arts in those attempts in which he has previously failed. And this accounts for an occasional notable failure of minds possessing a high order of native talent. It is the result of defective mental discipline, much more than of the absence of the inspirations of genius. The intellectual powers ought to be permanently subjected to the government of their appropriate laws of action, till obedience becomes *habitual* and *easy*—till the mind acquires a confidence that each one of its powers, in its place, will *always* act, and act with the facility, vigor, and uniformity which it has attained by often repeated and successful efforts. Such a discipline of the *individual* powers will, as its legitimate consequence, secure their well balanced action relatively to each other. It will prevent those cases of mental monstrosity, in which one power gains such an ascendancy over the rest, as to constitute it a kind of *intellectual fungus*, abstracting the health and vitality of the others to supply its own morbid enlargement. Such a discipline will enable the mind to grapple with, and to master, those complex subjects which call into requisition consecutively most or all of its active capacities.

Nor are the *social* powers, when developed, to be left without law. When we consider their relations to society, the amount of individual happiness which they involve, and reflect on the strength of the social principle and the violence of human passions in youth, the supreme importance of subjecting these powers to a chaste and delicate discipline, is sufficiently evident. A discipline which, on the one hand, shall secure from monastic reserve and moroseness, and on the other, shall sternly suppress that inordinate love of companionship, which begets a fondness for dress and dashing, and makes the toilet and the

parlor, instead of the desk and recitation room, the absorbing objects of the student's thoughts. In a word, a discipline which will so regulate the social powers and form the social habits of the educated youth, as to fit him for a polite, kind, dignified communion with his species.

The discipline of the awakened moral powers of the young mind is a subject of still graver moment. There are laws, but not of human institution, to regulate the action of these powers. And on their subjection and *willing* obedience to these laws depend the virtuous habits, the moral character, and the immortal destiny of mind. These powers are peculiarly refractory and impatient of the salutary restraints of law. In man's present lapsed state they are prone to great obliquity of action. And yet if we can cultivate an acute sensibility of conscience to the precepts of divine revelation, a proper discipline of all the moral powers is then easily effected. A conscience keenly sensitive to truth must, if possible, be secured as the angel with flaming sword, to deter the other powers from forbidden courses of action, whilst its convictions of right, concurring with the promises and rewards of virtue, must so control their activities as to make each of them to act uniformly in view of its appropriate object, and all of them to act together in harmony under that system of government which the Creator designed for them. Such a discipline is to be applied to these powers as is adapted, on the one hand, to prevent them from being employed on infidel speculation and latitudinarianism, or on *the moonlight theory* of a liberal Christianity, "falsely so called," and on the other, to secure them from the influence of bigotry, fanaticism, and every species of religious extravagance. Such a discipline as is adapted to fit the educated youth for the duties and the noble destinies of a pure, Bible Christianity.

There is still an important department in a course of thorough education to be noticed—viz. *the adaptation of these developed and disciplined powers of human nature to the exigencies of man's being*. To accomplish this fully, I am aware that it would require the mind to be brought into contact with the practical realities of life. Such a

contact cannot, in the nature of the case, be effected while the student remains in the seclusion of the College. Yet it by no means follows that there can be no improvement on that system of purely abstract training which has too long prevailed in literary institutions. That system seems to be founded on the supposition that the mind is to continue in a degree insulated and aloof from the common current of human affairs, and that the great end of education is to fit it for a kind of Platonic meditation, in which it shall be as much as possible abstracted from the common-sense concerns of life. This may furnish one reason why so little practical good has been achieved by the multitude of educated men who have lived and died in ages gone by. For it must be admitted that, of the whole number of such, few have made any deep and enduring impression on their own generation, or on those that followed. Now we suppose it possible so far to alter this peculiar abstractedness of training, as to give at least a practical, business-like turn to the powers of the young mind. One thing is certain, *that* system of education is essentially defective *now*, which is not conducted with reference to the spirit and the prominent signs of the age in which we live. In the liberal education of youth, in this country, a reference to the *intellectual* characteristics of our times is indispensable. This is not a period in the history of mind marked merely by passive musings. The tide of things is not about to drift our youth from the seclusion of the College into a vast solitude where they may pursue, in learned leisure, scholastic abstractions. They are about to be called into immediate sympathy with that intense intellectual action which is now agitating the civilized world. This is the æra foreseen by the prophetic eye of the great British statesman, CANNING,—“the age of the war of opinion.” And here in our own country are now to be canvassed some of those great questions that have convulsed and overthrown empires. There is an amazing waking up of mind here, preparatory, perhaps, to some new order of things in our history. The intellect of this nation, like Samson, brought out of prison when his beard and his locks began to grow, seems determined to take hold of the pillars of all our institutions, and

try their strength and stability. Heaven grant that the fearful analogy be not consummated in a similar memorable catastrophe? Ours is the country above all others, where the action of the popular mind is called for on all subjects. Every measure of political, social, or religious polity is subjected to the scrutiny of mind,—the general mind will judge and decide upon it. And these are not transient features in the intellectual peculiarities of our times. They are becoming the *settled habitudes* of mind in this country, and out of them will arise that mighty conflict of antagonist principles, that will shake once more, not the earth only, but the heavens also, preparatory to the final triumphs of liberty, social order, and religion in the world? Now, in conducting the education of youth, is it not manifest that an effort should be made to adapt the action of their intellectual powers to these exigencies of the times? Ought they not, if possible, to be formed to habits of close and discriminating thought—of calm and correct judgment—of acute and consecutive reasoning—and of patient and laborious investigation. How else shall all the attainments of their education be rendered available to the practical purposes of their present being.

In this part of their training, reference ought also to be had to the *social characteristics* of our times. It is sufficiently obvious that our educated youth are not about to live in that simple and undisturbed state of society which characterized this country in the earlier periods of its history. Since the days of our fathers society has been gradually undergoing a change, which of late is becoming more marked and perceptible. The simple habits and the inartificial intercourse of our forefathers are fast passing away.

We have now in the midst of us, on the one side, a spirit of levelling equalization, that would amalgamate all classes and colors.* We have a disorganizing atheism burrowing under the very foundations of social order, with the avowed intention of bringing the whole fabric

*It is well known to the author's friends, that *before* he had any prospect of settling in a Southern state, he was then, as *he is still*, warmly opposed to the spirit and measures of abolitionism.

down upon our heads, and of remodelling it after its own fashion, on the ruins of our property, and, if needs be, at the expense of our lives? On the other side, we have something of the aristocratic spirit, the pride of wealth and equipage, and the vicious refinements of the old world, making an experiment on the higher classes of society here in the new. Those social powers of our youth then, which are to govern their connections, intercourse and relations in society, ought to have an adaptation of action to this existing state of things. Our educated men ought to give law to the social republic. Their influence will of necessity be great, in giving complexion to society in the age in which they live. Of what unutterable importance then is it, that their social powers should be trained to such an aptitude of acting *always right*, that Agrarian atheism on the one hand, and the pretensions of aristocratic pride on the other, should never claim their company—that they should go forth upon the arena of social life, the advocates, by precept and example, of those inartificial manners and customs, and the permanent supporters of that system of social order which are founded on the unperverted principles of human nature, and are befitting the *republicanism* of America.

In that adaptation of action in the moral powers at which a complete system of education ought to aim, reference must also be had to the *moral characteristics* of the age in which we live. Our educated youth are not about to live in a period of moral darkness and slumber, such as overwhelmed and oppressed the human mind in the middle ages. Since the period of the reformation especially, the moral government of the Creator has been carrying forward its adjustments, to fit us for that day of predicted glory which is yet to bless and brighten our fallen world. The oracles of God are now beginning to speak to large portions of society where once their voice was not heard. The moral energies of this country are rapidly coming under a new and unwonted impulse. National institutions contemplating mighty results are now founded. Benevolent enterprises are beginning to be projected on a scale of magnitudes commensurate with the wants and the miseries of an apostate race. And it requires no prophet to pre-

dict that there will yet be in this land a *combination of moral forces* that will tell with tremendous effect on the destinies of the world. As a consequence of this extended and intense action in the benevolent elements, we may observe that those overgrown systems of error which have held such a protracted and mysterious sway over millions, are now beginning to be shaken. And, like their author, the father of lies, when he knew that his time was to be short, they are betaking themselves to their last intrenchments, and gathering themselves up in the strength of desperation, for their last mighty conflict with the victorious principles of truth. Now, in giving to the moral powers of youth a practical adaptedness to action, such characteristics of our times as these cannot be safely overlooked. They will constitute the moral realities of life to the young as soon as they shall have completed their education and mingled with society. It is obvious then, that their moral powers ought to be adapted to act on a *great scale*—that our youth ought to be capable of enlarged and discriminating views, and of a strong and *principled* love of truth—that conscience ought to be enthroned in its legitimate supremacy, to reign with absolute control over their minds—that their moral sympathies ought to be so trained as to fix only on proper objects, and to fix on them with *becoming intensity*. In a word, that their entire energies should be adapted to kindle and glow in the expanded and exalted purpose of blessing the world with an unparalleled benevolent activity.

The great question is yet to be decided—*What influence our educated men will have on the moral destinies of this nation!* A question involving all those dear and mighty interests which bind us in hope to this and to a future world. With such a question pending, I tremble for the safety of my country, and blush for its reputation for sound philosophy, when I reflect that here an attempt has been made to break up the alliance between learning and religion, and to sever our literary institutions from the practical influence of a pure Christianity. I am happy to know that this *is not* to be the order of things in Hampden Sydney. I am not called to take the helm without a chart or compass. And I never shall embark on a voyage of such perils

unless I can nail the Bible to the mast. We shall avoid all mere proselytism and the inculcation of minor sectarian peculiarities. But we shall *strenuously endeavor* so to develope, and discipline, and adapt to action the moral powers of youth, that, appreciating highly their own immortal interests, they shall go out hence on the highways of society a chosen band, clothed in the panoply of heaven to act as *the lifeguards* of the virtue, order and common Christianity of their country. Such are our views of a system of education suited to all the powers of human nature. But I have neither the arrogance, vanity, nor presumption, to suppose that I shall have more, if as much, success in the practical details of this arduous work as those hitherto engaged in it. Indeed, so far from this, that had my own judgment only been concerned, I should never have *chosen* the office on which I have now entered. It is not of *my* seeking. Driven by protracted ill health from the darling pursuit of my heart, preaching the gospel and pastoral life, and that door shut upon me, a gracious providence opened this, and hedged up my way to enter here. To me it is a new and untried department of labor: and the affirmation is made with no affected humility, that I now enter upon it with a diffidence not easily appreciated. I am not unmindful of the age, experience, learning, and profound abilities of my illustrious predecessors in office.

It well becomes *me* to tread with modest and tremulous steps in a path consecrated by the luminous career of such men as the brothers Smith, an Alexander, a Hoge, and a Cushing. "There were giants in the earth in those days—mighty men, even men of renown." But they have gone, as we trust, to adorn higher spheres of usefulness and glory, and to shine in the firmament of God: whilst the radiance of their characters, still not lost to earth, lingers, like the setting sunbeams, on the high places of Hampden Sydney. They have *all* gone save one, at whose feet, as the Gamaliel of the Church, it has been my distinguished privilege to sit, and to whose masterly management of the young mind I am much indebted for whatever of mental furniture I possess. I enter upon my duties, however diffident, with the unblenching purpose of doing what I *can* to promote the best interests

of the Institution over which I am called to preside. True, with a body and a mind partially wrecked by the arduous labors of past years and by successive attacks of prolonged illness, I cannot promise much. But I come to the performance of my new duties cheerfully, and with the frankness and integrity of a man in *sober earnest* to do what I can.

Knowing and admiring, as I always have done, the noble generosity of the Virginian character, I throw myself unreservedly upon the clemency, and I expect the prompt, cordial, *efficient* co-operation of this honorable Board of Trustees. I do more. With a heart still bleeding under a recent and final separation from that beloved people, whose sympathies and prayers have been the solace of my past life for years, I throw myself upon the kindness of this privileged Christian community. Most gladly would I find a *home* in their affections. Most devoutly do I hope for and desire the sustaining influence of *their* sympathies and of *their* supplications to heaven in my behalf and in behalf of this Institution. Let all the pious and prayerful join with me to-day, in a renewed consecration of this College to God, under the deep conviction that "except the Lord keep the city the watchman waketh but in vain." With such for my allies, and God as my help, I shall enter on my labors with the assurance that the inspiring motto—" *nil desperandum est* "—is far more applicable to Hampden Sydney than it was to the republic of Rome in the zenith of her glory.

prayers of the parent; just as the child of Jewish parents, circumcised at only eight days of age, when presented in true faith. Such faith always secures God's blessing. But this whole discussion shows that the benefits of this practice do not depend upon the knowledge or feelings of the child at the time of its administration, nor are they to be expected in the absence of all faithfulness on the part of the parent. The influence to which we now refer is that which is felt when the child arrives at years of discretion, under the teachings of the Church and of his parents. If allowed to grow up in spiritual ignorance, without religious culture, without restraint, and under the impression that he is an alien from the commonwealth of Israel, of course we can expect no good results from his mere baptism. But let both the Church and the parents teach him his true position, remind him of the obligations of his baptism, which bind him as well as them, assure him that he has been solemnly set apart from worldly and sinful ends for God's holy service, that he really belongs to God's Church, and can never annul the obligations which have been assumed for him; let them instruct him faithfully in divine things, teach him the truths signified and the vows implied by his baptism, endeavor by earnest efforts to persuade him to assume these vows, seek to restrain him from vice and evil companionship, and by all means, and constantly, cling to him as a member of Christ's kingdom; let this course be pursued, and we venture the assertion that no one will then have occasion to doubt the utility, much less to affirm the evil tendency of this practice. The fact must be admitted that both the Church and parents are greatly at fault as to all this. The children of Zion are too often treated as strangers. Their sacred relation is ignored. Their birth-right is denied them. Many are careful to affix the seal, but as careless to secure the inheritance for their consecrated children. It is time the Church were more practical in her views of this subject, and had ceased to end her efforts with the mere ceremony of baptism, or with mere early training. We must treat this minor membership more as a reality. This will silence cavils. This will wipe off the stigma so often affixed to us, unjustly, it is true, but having some prac-

tical ground, in our unfaithfulness. Above all, this will secure from a faithful God, for ourselves and our children, the priceless blessings of that covenant whose sacred seal we have had applied to us and to them.

ARTICLE II.

(x) THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE AS A TRAINING OF
THE MIND.

The question, which, at the present day, most of all divides opinion among the friends of liberal education, is the relative amount of time and the scope which ought to be assigned, in our schools and colleges, to the study of the languages. In this country especially, where a readier hearing is given to every demand for what is practical, and men approve by preference what is promptly available for profit in life and learning, the advance of a more materialistic theory of education seems to threaten an ascendancy which is alarming to those who hold to the old and long undisputed belief, that the study of language, but especially of the so-called classic languages, provides the best and most varied forms of excitement and practice for the opening and strengthening mind. The present writer belongs to this class; and desires in the observations which follow, to offer a sincere, if inconsiderable, contribution to the defence of this discipline.

We propose to confine our view to one single aspect of the subject; for a general defence of the "humanities," did it seem otherwise more called for than it does, could hardly be embraced within our present limits, nor would it necessarily contain the argument which in our opinion should now be principally opposed to the most serious objections urged against the study of lan-

x) By Walter Blair,

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guage—objections urged, if not with justice, yet with an apparently increasing practical effect.

The study of language, in the larger and current sense of these words, is not restricted for its material to that objective mass of thought-bearing sounds or signs which are collected in lexicons and described in grammars, that is, to words and their necessary and actual relations: it is popularly and commonly extended to embrace the artificial records of language, that is to say, *literature*, and that inclusive of both its form and its contents, and by consequence therefore, in some sense, to the whole field of human knowledge and sentiment. Accordingly, the teacher of languages in our schools is allowed or expected to teach poetry, rhetoric, and eloquence; more or less of logic, metaphysics, and philosophy; and the history of arts, of manners, and of nations.

Concerning a school which is active in all these departments, it would be simple to ask, whether its discipline were a healthy and useful one or not.

It is evident, then, that an inquiry growing out of the words which stand at the head of this article, must be far less extended, if it shall acquire any scientific interest, or have any practical bearing on the interests of education. The philology which we have here to treat of, must be purely linguistic in its character; and we shall address our attention strictly to the study of language considered as such.

It is to modern scholars that we owe it that this inquiry can be advanced beyond a few hesitating and uncertain steps. While it was the glory of the Greeks—the first fosterers of that spirit and practice of the speculative study of nature which constitutes the momentum of modern science—to develop a language unsurpassed for its richness of material, its variety and faithful delicacy of form; yet, for a long time, they made no effort to scrutinize the laws of this development, or to comprehend or portray the nature of this wonderful organism.

Plato commenced the inquiry in philosophic spirit, but with the smallest results, as we see from his Dialogues. And the subtle question disputed with so much sprightliness between

Socrates and Hermogenes in the *Cratylus*, whether words were from *nature*, or by *imposition*, was then, no doubt, incapable of the solution which remained to be evolved from the toilsome labors of students of our later time, who have observed, classified, re-examined, and reclassified phenomena in language which those men saw and heard, but did not heed; principles which they practised and contributed to establish, but all unconsciously; till finally, these men, beginning at the last and struggling back to the first, have left tracks behind them upon which the logician may advance; and men are now moving every where with the sure tread of scientific confidence through the midst of the vast mass of words and forms of speech, which formerly appeared obscure, fantastic, various without limit, and utterly intractable to scientific method.

If it were our object, at this time, to vindicate the claims of modern scholars to the conquest of the material of this department of study, to an advancement of the confines of this inductive method into the field of language, an examination would become necessary into the history of philology. But the comparative progress so laid bare, though highly interesting, and, in its place, important for the student of language, yet bears not upon the essential nature of the question which we now have in hand. Nevertheless, a decent respect seems to forbid us, in an inquiry of this kind, to pass by without any mention the names of men of whose accumulations and example we are the heirs; men who have devoted themselves to these pursuits now with keen ardor and bold, if often fruitless speculation, and now with patient and prodigious labor, unrewarded sometimes to them, but fruitful to us. A rapid survey of the most prominent points in the history of philology will be found also to subserve our present purpose.

It is in the dialogues of Plato that we see the first evidences of the Greek mind separating itself so far from the external part of the organism of language as to make it the object of observation and scrutiny. The speculative philosopher, however, addressed himself, not to a painful investigation of the laws of speech as his end in view, but leaped at once over the whole field now occupied by the science of grammar, and labored at the

ultimate problem of the origin of language, an inquiry which, in the Cratylus, is conducted on *a priori* principles. As might be expected from the application of this method in a region as yet unexplored, many of his conclusions or fancies as to the nature and application of names, are as false and ill-founded in reason as any of the word-derivations of a more or less superficially specious but inwardly hollow character, which in modern times have, until lately, kept the discipline of etymology in such ill repute. But whatever Plato may have failed to do, this at least he did, and apparently was the first among the Greeks to do: he pointed out language as an objective reality—a system of phenomena which invited research.

Since Plato, the study of language has never slept. The Stoics practised it with interest, adopting it among the materials of their philosophy. They regarded words, however, only in their relations to the mind, and contributed therefore little or nothing, it seems, to the establishment of a positive science of grammar.

First in the Alexandrian school of literati and philosophical critics, do we find a real step forward—and yet not many steps—made in this direction. Their business was to expound the mass of classic Greek literature, whose period of bloom had come to a close. While the character of their studies was principally literary and antiquarian, and the observations which they made upon the language were more critical and lexicographical than grammatical, yet they used at least the division of words according to the classification by “parts of speech,” which is still retained among the rudiments of rational syntax.

These studies had flourished at Alexandria for a hundred years, when the same spirit and the same method were transplanted to Rome, already deeply imbued with Greek literature, by Crates of Mallos (A. U. C. 588).* And down to the latest days of the Latin literature, grammar in this sense was cultivated, till, if we stop our reckoning at Priscian,† we can count

* See Suetonius, *Ill. Gramm.*, c. 2.

† Priscianus Cæsariensis fl. A. D. 510.

at least fifty names, extending over nearly seven hundred years, of men (including now and then one of great fame in other departments)* who wrote upon the subject of language. But of not one of all this list can we find, either by what remains to us of their writings, or from the account given by Suetonius and others, of their studies, that they found,† or at least that they practised with efficiency any more rational method of philology than that of Erastosthenes or Apollonius of Alexandria. Their functions were primarily and mainly to expound the poets. And this they did by reciting them, and by editing‡ and annotating their text; the annotations containing antiquarian, historical, or other lore, and parallel passages from other authors, collected often by immense reading, and adduced for the support, in point of usage, of the forms of speech before them.§

In the earliest days of the study of grammar among the Romans, the character of this study was thus given|| by Terentius Varro (*"doctissimus Romanorum"*): "The functions of the grammarian consist of reading, verbal exposition, emendation, and criticism." And none of the long line of subsequent Latin grammarians ever distributed their subject under categories more nearly coinciding with those under which the modern science of grammar is prosecuted. As to their method of treatment, let it suffice to refer to the laborious, indeed, but purely empirical

* E. g.: M. Terentius Varro (*nat. A. U. C.* 638, *mort.* 727) and C. J. Caesar.

† It is to be regretted that we have no remains (see the fragment in *Aul. Gell.* xviii. 8, 3 sq.) of the composition "*de Analogia*" addressed to Cicero, and written by the clear-headed and scholarly J. Caesar. The title, the author's name, and the words of Gellius (*Noct. Att.* 1, 10, and 19, 8) and Fronto, lead us to suspect that herein was contained at least an essay at a more rational treatment of languages. Fronto says that "during the fierce struggle of the Gallic war, he carefully elaborated the two books *de analogia*, and amid the shower of weapons he discussed the declension of nouns, the breathings, and the relative functions of words.

‡ As Varro did Plautus. See *Aul. Gell. N. Att.* iii. 3.

§ See Varro ap. Diomed. ii., p. 421, ed. Putsch.; Quint. *Inst. Orat.* i. 4; Suet. *Ill. Gramm.* c. 1; Cic. *Orat.* i. 42.

|| Ap. Diomed. l. l.

handling of the division called prosody in our modern hand-books, and which we have by direct transmission from these writers; to which we add a brief quotation from the grammarian Diomedes, who wrote in the early part of the fifth century after Christ.

"Faults of speech," says he, "may be generally described as these: obscurity, inelegance, and barbarism. Obscurity has eight species: acyrologia, pleonasmus, perissologia, macrologia, amphibologia, tautologia, eclipsis, and ænigma. Inelegance has five species: tapinosis, æschrologia, cacophaton, cacozelia, and cacosyndeton. Barbarism is divided into two parts: solœcismus and barbarismus, of which again there are many sorts."*

The same author says of the conjunction *et*, that it is used "first simply; then simply, but figuratively; then interrogatively; then indignantly; then confirmatively; then with a causal sense; then in an adjunctive and promissory sense; then adjectively; then ordinatively; then superlatively; and finally, diminutively."†

* Diomed. lib. ii. ap. Putsch. p. 443.

† Diom. lib. ii. ap. Putsch. p. 411. Seneca (Epp. 108) points out the different ways in which the same subject was treated by the philosopher, the philologist, and the *grammarian* of his time. He says: "Cum Ciceronis libros de Republica prehendit hinc philologus aliquis, hinc grammaticus, hinc philosophiæ deditus, alius alio curam suam mittit: philosophus admiratur contra justitiam dici tam multa potuisse. Cum ad hanc eandem lectionem philologus accessit, hoc subnotat: duos Romanos reges esse, quorum alter patrem non habet, alter matrem: nam de Servii matre dubitatur; Anci pater nullus. Eisdem libros cum grammaticus explicuit primum—*reapse* dici a Cicerone, id est *re ipsa*, in commentarium refert, nec minus *sepse*, id est *se ipse*. Deinde transit ad ea quæ consuetudo seculi mutavit." The business of a grammarian, of which we here have a glimpse, was considered by this philosopher as so unworthy of a great mind, and so small a pursuit compared with the other aims in the study of literature, that, in the same chapter from which we have quoted, he goes on to say: "Sed ne et ipse, dum aliud ago, in philologum aut grammaticum dilabar, illud admoneo, auditionem philosophorum lectionemque ad propositum beatæ vitæ trahendam, non ut verba prisca aut ficta captemus et translationes improbas figurasque dicendi, sed ut profutura præcepta et magnificas voces et animosas, quæ mox in rem transferantur: sic ista ediscamus, ut, quæ fuerint verba, sint opera."

So far our object has been to indicate, from an historical point of view, the prominent points in the history of grammar. This we have felt at liberty to do only in the most cursory manner to this point, and find ourselves obliged now to turn from it altogether. For the period which would next come under view,—that which intervenes between the revival of letters and our own day,—while it is brilliant with the discoveries which have remodelled old sciences and founded new ones, is big also with such important labors in the science of language, that the merest sketch in outline of the successively advancing phases of this discipline in modern times could hardly be compressed into a subordinate part of a short essay.

Petrarcha, Scaliger, Bentley, Wolf, Bopp have reached by a series of bold, successful, and sustained advances, a fixed and solid point, from which now the troops of eager students who have followed them can discern the tides as by generations and by ages they ebb and flow in the wide sea of words. To these great names, (and especially to the last three,) we chiefly owe the application of strictly scientific discrimination to the phenomena of language,—a process which has already produced a profusion of the richest results, bringing to light certain permanent and clearly discernible marks, according to which human speech may be divided into families, and, in each of these families, the principles which have ruled it in its rise, its bloom, or its disintegration and decay.

We claim then that the study of language can now be prosecuted as a science; and this is the one point which, in connexion with the subject before us, it concerns us to prove; for it is too plain to be denied that the discipline which is devoid of scientific principle cannot furnish a healthy exercise for the reason and its attendant functions; while, on the other hand, any system which requires the constant use of the logical powers, in the large sense in which this word is used, must be a useful training for the mind. "Science brings its own exercise," is a remark of Tacitus. And this exercise is its use, so far as education is concerned. We need not ask for brilliancy nor for any other character of *discoveries* which are to be made; nay, no discov-

eries at all are necessary, but the free, unhindered, lawful play of the observation and the reason. It is the faculty of observation or discernment especially, whose training brings strength to the mind. This is the power which is born with the genius, and by this have all great inquirers been distinguished. We said discoveries need not be made. Mr. Stewart describes Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding as "the richest contribution of well-observed and well-described facts which was ever bequeathed by a single individual;" while Sir James Mackintosh remarks, "if Locke made few discoveries, Socrates made none, yet both did more for the improvement of the understanding, and not less for the progress of knowledge than the authors of the most brilliant discoveries."*

But this faculty can find no play on material of artificial source or arbitrary character. We must decide these questions, then: Is a scientific method possible in grammar? or are the pretensions of modern philologists boastful? Is language an organism? Is it, in its elements, and in their internal and mutual relations, a system in such a sense the offspring of natural sources, as that natural laws do govern it? Are its phænomena the fruit of man's caprice; or are they, though vying almost in variety with the countless forms of human thought and fancy, yet subject nevertheless to these never-yielding laws which fancy too, even in its frolics, obeys—the laws of necessity? Such are the laws which form the woof and warp of all the web of nature: and as it is from their calm contemplation that the purified mind looks up to the Great First Cause, so their pursuit is the noble calling of science, a pursuit equally ennobling, elevating, strengthening to him who conducts it with a proper spirit, whether it carry him among the insects or among the stars.

The arguments to show that the material of speech is proper stuff for science, are *a priori* and *a posteriori*. In following the former method, we shall meet at once the question of the origin of language: If it be made by man upon arbitrary principles,

* Essay on Bacon and Locke, by A. Potter.

then its laws—if, in that case, it can be said to have any—are certainly not natural laws; while, if it be the work of nature, even though framed by the instrumentality of the mind of man, then such laws must prevail, and a science of language is certainly possible.

We decline here to approach this obscure and abstract speculation, which since Plato has exercised many minds, and which, while it has been plied since the middle of the last century with particular interest and zeal, yet has not, even in the hands of Wilhelm von Humboldt, reached any positive or satisfactory issue.

It is with confidence, however, that we turn to the *a posteriori* evidence of our point, inasmuch as a glance at the proceedings actually instituted and successfully practised in grammar will be enough to show that a scientific treatment of language is possible, by showing it to be an accomplished fact—a treatment not indeed fully developed, but growing daily in inward strength and outward favor. Glancing backward for a moment, we might well ask whether the reasoning powers or their attendant functions of observation and memory could find any wholesome training in such exercises as those which we have quoted as a sample of the ancient treatment of grammar; and we might have quoted many similar examples from a more modern period. But it was only because grammarians were so long unconscious of, or, when they suspected, were at least unable to pursue the natural laws which pervade the matter with which they deal, that their classifications were effected in so arbitrary and artificial a manner.

Ordinary phænomena were listed according to any plan which might appear to have the advantage of convenience; and the anomalies, instead of being traced to new causes, natural and uniformly operating—in other words, to other laws, were huddled together, invested with learned names, and set aside in a sort of curiosity-shop of their own. “There is a kind of change of form in words,” says Diomedes, speaking of an appearance whose rise has been since rationally accounted for, “which is a barbarism, but which the learned, when they use it, call met-

aplasmos." This purely empirical method of procedure, while it is waning, and rapidly waning now,—even in England, at last, that conservative stronghold of the ancient and respectable,—yet has by no means disappeared; nor indeed can it be entirely dispensed with, until the scientific method has been sufficiently extended to occupy all the ground. But we have to show that such extension has already proceeded far enough to make it manifest that it shall certainly continue, and to invest this discipline with a scientific character.

Let us compare then, for this purpose, some of the laws of grammar with others of the so-called positive sciences. A law of natural philosophy relating to motion of free liquids says, "Running water will find a level equal to, or beneath the elevation of, its source." The law of "number" in grammar says, "In a given language a given form or forms will express an undivided conception of the mind; and another given and corresponding form or forms will express a group of similar conceptions." Both laws are reached precisely in the same way. Are both equally valid? Exceptions prove not any rule, but disprove it; hence, if we can find exceptions to either of these laws, their truth is destroyed. A number of apparent exceptions can easily be brought to the rule of grammar. Confining ourselves to one language, we have the words *populus* and *arena*, (which we may take as representatives of a large number of others,) denoting a group of things, while they wear the form appropriate to the expression of an undivided conception; while, on the other hand, we have *ædes*, for a house, *quadrigæ*, for a four-horse chariot, *altaria*, for an altar, *ligna*, for firewood, and *mella*, for honey.

We have said that these exceptions are not fatal to the law, since they are not real but only apparent. This will be seen after considering that the function of words is not to express *things*, but *ideas*. However divisible and actually divided may be the matter designated by *populus* and *arena*, yet the idea in the mind corresponding to these realities on the one hand, and these words on the other, may be and often is a unit. Again, however compact and isolated a house may be in fact, the conception of it may involve, and, in the Latin habit of thought,

actually did involve the idea of its group of apartments; so the thoughts in the conception of the thing designated by *quadrigæ* are separated, and form a group. This separation, occasioned by a consideration of the horses, is not logical indeed, when understood of the whole chariot, but there is no sort of necessity that it should be logical, as logic is but a very small part of what is represented by language, which may, of course, present ideas wholly irreconcilable with logic. So *ligna*, fire-wood, is a plural conception such as is natural, not only to the Latin mind, but also to the English, as we see by a similar use of the word *coals*, which is common in England.

Fronto* was puzzled to know why *mella*, a plural form, was often used to denote the substance *honey*, while *milk*, for instance, was not similarly designated. But very brief reflection will serve to explain an Italian's conception of this substance in a multiplied sense, especially when we have read Pliny's three chapters† on the varieties of this favorite diet. Here we have described honey Sicilian, Hymettan, Hyblian, Cretan, Cyprian, and African, honey dark and honey bright, honey thick and honey thin, and honey of the spring, of the summer, and the autumn: surely a sufficient variety of aspects.‡

The law of grammar, as above enunciated, is good and firm then. How fares it with the law of physics? From the spheroidal form of the earth, it is plain that the mouth of the river Mississippi, among others, is farther from the centre of the earth than is its source: so that here we have a river actually flowing up hill. This is an exception, not apparent, but real and valid,

* Aul. Gell. N. Att. 19, 8.

† Nat. Hist. lib. xi. c. 13, 14, 15.

‡ That such plural conceptions are natural and regular, and not arbitrary, may be illustrated, by the way, by a reappearance of this same tendency in regard to an appellative derived from this very word, and applied, in the English language, to a similar substance. From the plural of the word *mel* was formed, within the Latin language, the derivative word *mellacum*, which denoted a sweet decoction from the must of wine. From this the French have the name *melasse*, and the English the word *molasses*, which we again find invested with the plural form.

so valid as utterly to overthrow the scientific value of the familiarly known law of a department of science much praised for its severity.* That the physical phænomenon in question can be accounted for by another and more general law, is not here to the purpose to be remarked; the design being merely to vindicate for grammar its due, face to face with the other sciences, by a comparison of the strictness with which the canons of induction may be, and actually are applied in the fields respectively occupied by them.

There is great need, as we cannot but think, for a detailed exhibition of the state of this case. In the pursuit of such details alone will appear the proper force of the argument which we have designed to maintain, and which all the preceding remarks have been intended to subserve; but the undertaking is too large for our present limits; we commit and commend it to the interest and consideration of the reader, confident that the more his intelligent attention is directed to this matter, the better will he feel the claim which we have set up for the genuine nature of science in Language—a claim which, although no novelty, has been as yet too little acknowledged, or too slightly esteemed.

A late Latin grammarian† declares that the ruling principle which has guided him in the framing of his system is “the desire to trace the facts and phænomena of language to a philosophical or rational source”; and from his book you may illustrate the four methods of induction as given by Mr. Mill in his “System of Logic” as beautifully as this author has done from the region of physical science; and that too with a variety of material measured only by the possibilities of utterable forms of thought. Thus the signification of the moods is to be established by the “method of agreement;” the negative sense implied by the use of the words *quisquam* and *ullus*, in the Latin, by the “method of difference;” the phænomena known as attraction in language, by

* We doubt whether the scientific value of this law of physics, rightly understood, can be invalidated. [Eds. S. P. R.]

† Zumpt, Lat. Gram., Introduction.

the "method of residues;" and the agreement between adjective and substantive words, by the "method of concomitant variations." Deduction has also ample play in this discipline. It is employed as well in the investigation of the formation of words and analogical forms of inflexion within the limits of a given language, as also, in the comparison of languages, in the determination of certain forms of words in one language, which, by clearly ascertained laws, must bear a given correspondence to certain other forms in another language occupying an antecedent or parallel place in the historical development of the parent stock to which they belong. A general law of this nature within the Latin language is, that "when to a stem ending in *on*, *ion*, the suffix for the diminutive, *culus*, *cula* is added, the *o* in the stem becomes *u*."* From this we may deduce the following: Out of *carbon*, the stem of *carbo*, we have *carbunculus* for a diminutive; out of *homon*, we have *homunculus*; from *avon* (a derived stem, *avo* enlarged by the formative *n*), *avunculus*; from *oration*, *oratiuncula*; and from *concion*, *conciuncula*; all of which forms actually occur. Again, from a general law we deduce, that, the Sanscrit form being *aswas*, the Latin will be *equus*; Sanc. *sam*, Lat. *cum* (*quum*). Similarly, by a law controlling French formations from the Latin; the Latin being *manus*, the French will be *main* (by discarding the final syllable, and enlargement of the first); Lat. *panis*, Fr. *pain*; Lat. *canis*, Fr. *chien*; Lat. *rem* (acc.), Fr. *rien*; Lat. *carmen*,† Fr. *charme*; Lat. *facilis*, Fr. *facile*. Let these few random instances serve to suggest the countless others, by which it could be shown that deduction and induction are both at home in the study of language.

But if the study of language is thus seen to stand on an equal footing with the other departments of science, considered as a field for the exercise of the reasoning powers of the mind, are there not some other considerations which entitle us to assign it a comparatively higher place? The following appear to be some

* See Corssen, *Aussprache*, etc. Vol. I., p. 263.

† Sansc. Vkr.

good claims to this distinction : 1. The material to be worked upon in the discipline of language is richer perhaps in its variety than that of any of the other sciences, a circumstance which offers a larger scope for the sharpening and exercise of the powers of observation and analysis, by which the marks of classification are discerned and fixed. 2. While we cannot go so far as to regard philology as coextensive with the whole field of human knowledge, as certain modern scholars seem still to hold, and as some of Plato's utterances would lead us to suppose was virtually his opinion, yet the history of this study has shown it to embrace the impulses, at least, of many sciences ; while a further consideration of its nature will make it evident that it necessarily involves the actual elements of some.*

A word consists essentially of two parts : the outward sign and the thought. A word, therefore, cannot be known unless the thought be discerned ; and to classify words and the forms of words is to classify thoughts and the forms of thoughts,—the principle of the classification in the case having as much right to be determined by the thought as by the sound. Hence the study of language necessarily involves the elements of a mental science.

But further, language is not a given, fixed, and unchangeable thing. As a system it grows, enlarges, culminates, declines, disintegrates, reassembles around new centres, and vanishes, perhaps, in some of its forms, from the face of the earth. To trace this history is a part of the business of the student of language, and to observe and arrange or logically to deduce the causes of these changes, is the now much-practised occupation of comparative grammar.

But what are these causes ? To a large extent they are identical with the rudiments of the important science of ethnology,

* NOTE. B. G. Niebuhr says, in a letter to the mother of a young friend : " Since philology is an introduction to all intellectual pursuits, he who plies this discipline in his school-days with such zeal as if he thought it were to be his life-long employment, prepares himself thereby for any other career which he may select to enter upon at the University."

and make up the primary data of historical criticism. It was by viewing the application of philology in this direction that the great philologist, Fr. Aug. Wolf, was led to say of the study of the ancient languages: "The aim of this study is no other than the knowledge of the men of antiquity themselves, which knowledge arises out of the observation of the organic and significant development of a distinct national growth,—an observation which is dependent upon a study of the ancient remains." In order to show a practical application of this remark, we may be allowed to make a short extract from the introductory pages of the great work of Mommsen, a man whose brilliant achievements in the field of Roman history, are pointedly and unmistakably due in large degree to his successful studies in philology.

He says: "Whilst the now separated Indo-Germanic people formed a stem possessed of the same language, they reached a certain grade of culture, and their language developed a certain corresponding stock of words, which, as a common provision, all the separating branches took with them in a use conventionally fixed, and upon this stock, as a foundation, they then built further and independently for themselves. We find in this original stock, not only the simplest relations of being, of action, of perception, as *sum*, *do*, *pater*, but also a number of words marking an advance of civilisation, and these words, not merely in their roots, but in their forms developed in use, words which must be regarded as common property of the Indo-Germanic race, and which cannot be accounted for by the supposition of a parallel formation among the different separated branches of this family, nor by the hypothesis of a later adoption. In this way we possess evidence for the development of pastoral life, in that distant epoch anterior to the separation of the branches, in the unalterably fixed names of the domestic animals: Sanscrit *gaus* is Latin *bos*, Greek *bous*; Sansc. *aswas*, Lat. *equus*, Gr. *hippos*; Sansc. *hansas*, Lat. *anser*, Gr. *chen*, etc., just as *pecus*, *sus*, *poreus*, *taurus*, *canis*, are Sanscrit words. From this is to be inferred that in that distant period, the race, from which proceeds for us, since the times of Homer, all intellectual develop-

ment, had already advanced beyond the period of the mere huntsman's and fisher's life, and arrived at least to a relative fixedness of abode. On the other hand, we can command no proof as yet, that they had commenced to till the ground: the Græco-Latin names for the different kinds of corn, for example, do not, with one exception, appear in the Sanscrit. Corresponding to the Latin *ager* appears, indeed, a word in the Sanscrit, but not with its special signification. Again, for *aratrum* we have Sansc. *aratram*, but in the signification of *oar*, (or rudder,) *ship*.

"Evidence, on the other hand, for the knowledge of house and hut-building before the period of separation, exists in the words, Sansc. *dam(as)*, Lat. *domus*, Gr. *domos*; Sansc. *vesas*, Lat. *vicus*, Gr. *oikos*; Sansc. *dwaras*, Lat. *fores*, Gr. *thura*; and for boat-building, in the words, Sansc. *naus*, Gr. *naus*, Lat. *navis*, and others. So, for the use of wagons and the breaking of draught animals, in the words, Sansc. *akshas* (axle and car), Lat. *axis*, Gr. *axon*, *amaxon*; Sansc. *jugam*, Lat. *jugum*, Gr. *zugon*. So the wearing of clothes and the art of weaving, and finally, the common primitive ideas at least of religion, which prevailed among the separate branches of the Indo-Germanic stock, may be shown or inferred with the highest probability from a comparison of their languages." (Rom. Geschichte B. I., p. 14 seq.)

The importance of such investigations as these need not be enlarged upon; it is ours only to remark that they constitute a part of the discipline of the study of language.

Some may be disposed to object that the scientific method, whose practice we have sought to vindicate in language, is confined to the "higher walks" of this pursuit, and that its application can only be made by the advanced student. If such were the case, then indeed we should not have touched this question in its practical and useful bearings.

But that such is not the case is, in fact, involved in the very nature of our proposition itself. If the study of language is a science, then grammar must be a system pervaded throughout, even in its earliest elements, with firm and certain laws; and the student, if properly guided, will have, upon the very outset of

his studies, exercises for his mind of precisely the same nature as he will find any where within the limits of the vast field before him.

That this may be more and more recognised as a truth; that its value may be more and more appreciated; and that the practice of the study of language, from its earliest to its latest stages, may be more and more adjusted in accordance with this idea, ought to excite the desire, and to elicit the efforts of all the friends of this old and honored discipline.

ARTICLE III.

BUCKLE'S HISTORY OF CIVILISATION IN
ENGLAND.

[CONCLUDED.]

"History of Civilisation in England. By HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE. Volume I. From the Second London Edition. New York. D. APPLETON & Co., 346 and 348 Broadway: 1858."

In entering upon the review of the general scope and tendency of the work, there are certain matters which deserve special attention. Prominent among these is the relation of Mr. Buckle and his philosophy to Christianity—a relation which, though not distinctly defined, is yet not very equivocal. The Christianity left, when Mr. Buckle has done with it, is a very meagre affair. With occasional respectful allusions, (not too great, if it be but a human invention,) he has shorn it to a thing of nought. Stripped of its evidences, its doctrines, its dignity, denied its weight as testimony, its interpretation of man's relation to God disputed, its canon doubtful, its inspiration more than uncertain, its doc-

x see art. by Prof. Blair in
"Southern Magazine" Brit. Feb. 1871.
— on the characteristic difference between pp. 209.
Ancient & Modern Civilization 220.